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Abstract: 
The Scottish historical school had produced a variety of intellectual figures that 
determined the progress of social sciences. Its legacy is crystallised in the justification of 
history’s importance in social disciplines. Adam Smith was the most eminent product of 
the Scottish historical school. His work, despite of being the locus classicus of classical 
political economy, has promoted a chemical symphysis between theory and history. 
Evidently, his Scottish roots determined the character of his epistemic choices. His 
philosophy of science, together with a clearly defined methodology assigned history as the 
raison d’ etre of his work. More specifically the acceptance of Newton’s analytic-synthetic 
method opens the door to history to become a congenital ingredient of his analysis. The 
smithian work produced a special conjunction between method, epistemology, theory, and 
history that determined the history of political economy 
Keywords: Adam Smith, history, Scottish historical school, methodology, theory, 
epistemology 
 
Resumen: La Escuela Histórica Escocesa ha producido una variedad de figuras 
intelectuales que determinaron el progreso de las ciencias sociales. Su herencia se ha 
cristalizado en que ha proporcionado una justificación de la importancia que tiene la 
historia en las disciplinas sociales. Adam Smith fue el producto más eminente de la 
Escuela Histórica Escocesa. Su obra ha promovido una fusión entre teoría e historia. 
Evidentemente, sus raíces Escocesas determinaron el carácter de sus estudios epistémicos. 
Su filosofía de la ciencia, junto con una claramente definida metodología hicieron de la 
historia la raison d’ etre de su obra. Más específicamente, la aceptación del método 
analítico-sintético de Newton abrió las puertas a la historia para que devenga un 
ingrediente constitutivo de sus análisis. La obra smithiana presenta una conjunción 
especial entre método, epistemología, teoría e historia, que determinó la historia de la 
política económica. 
 









History and Historiography in the age of Scottish historical school 
The classical school of political economy had as its predecessor the 
legacy of Scottish Historicism. Evidently, the Scottish historical school was 
the reflection of specific historical fermentations and shaped the content of 
the classical school of political economy (Skinner 1990, 158). The tradition of 
Scottish Historicism was the product of the period of the Scottish 
Enlightenment, a period which had been connected with a general incision 
in the disciplines of social sciences. Skinner (1967, 32) notices that “Of all 
periods of Scottish history, the eighteenth century is surely one of the most 
striking” since it is connected with the emergence of profound economic and 
political changes, and with the blow up of fascinating intellectual ideas. Its 
intellective product, the Scottish historical school, despite of being recently 
recognised (Holloway 1963, 157) was the real crystallization of such an 
outburst. It is undeniable that the academic character of the Scottish 
historical school had been stemmed by its socio-economic environment: The 
necessity for economic growth, the demand for coordination within an 
economy with specialised production, the questions concerning income 
distribution, and the role of government, constituted the framework of 
eighteenth century Britain. Evidently, such pressing economic and social 
conditions set the scene for the inflorescence of an intense intellectual 
climate which attempted to systematize such transitive conditions. David 
Hume’s (1932, 225) famous celebration is indicative of such an intense 
literary process: “Really it is admirable, how many men of genius this 
country produces at present!” A. Dow, S. Dow, & A. Hutton (1997, 391) notice 
that “the intellectual environment was that of the Scottish Enlightenment” 
and was identified with a direct reaction against clerical dogmatism and by a 
straight disposition to acquire knowledge by reason. Evidently, the Scottish 
historical school influenced a variety of scientific disciplines, such as 
political economy, philosophy, ethics, law &c, but it’s more crucial impacts 
were upon the science of history. 
Evidently, there emerged among the Scottish scholars an attitude to 
understand and interpret the nature of these newfangled social and 
economic phenomena. The main feature of this attitude, despite of its multi-
disciplinarity (Montes 2003, 732), was the understanding of the historical 
evolution of such phenomena. Therefore, history’s importance was 
‘proximal’ in such a revolution of ideas. This is why Skinner (1975, 256) calls 
the period of the mid-eighteenth century as the ‘Age of History’. It is 
remarkable that no other age had such an intensive historical literature and 
criticism as the eighteenth century when, in Thompson’s words (1942, 94), 
“everyone read and talked history”.  
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However, the ‘Age of History’ followed the ‘Age of Erudition’ of the 
seventeenth century, which changed the general intellectual climate of the 
Middle Ages and set the scene for the emergence of a critical vein in 
historical writing. In the seventeenth century many discrete but interrelated 
events prepared the ground for a decisive drift in historical scholarship. 
Firstly, this century provided a large amount of historical materials since the 
dissolution of the monasteries in England- under Henry VIII- which was 
accompanied with the pillage of monastic libraries had thrown upon the 
market vast quantities of manuscripts and other documents which often 
could be bought for a song (Lambert & Schofield 2004, 3). Secondly, many 
auxiliary disciplines to history had emerged. The seventeenth century gave 
systematic and scientific form to chronology, paleography, bibliography, 
numismatics, and archeology (Lambert & Schofield 2004, 7-9). Thirdly, a fact 
that contributed to the stronger diffusion of scientific knowledge was the 
publishing opportunities that were conventionally varied. However, beyond 
these reasons, the most important fact that contributed to scientific 
advancement was that sciences in general and historical scholarship in 
particular being free from politics attained the necessary air to develop 
smoothly. Essentially therefore, this transitive period introduced a new era 
in historical scholarship, which was of cooperative nature, and at the same 
time inducted a general critical spirit in it. The most representative figure of 
this trend was Jean Mabillon who introduced the positive criticism and 
“prove the honesty of sources as well as the falsity of some” (Thompson 1942, 
19). Mabillon developed the rules and the criteria of judging sources by 
comparing a great number of documents of the same time, place, and 
country. Lord Acton in his Historical Essays and Studies observed that 
Mabillon  
“belongs to the family of pioneers, and […] is one of the best known 
names in the line of discoverers from Valla […] to Morgan […] and 
although disciplined and repressed by the strict reform of Saint Maur, 
he rose above all his brethren to be, as an historian, eminently solid 
and trustworthy, as a critic the first in the world” (1907, 460) 
It must be noticed that despite its French origins, the spiritual fermentations 
of the ‘Age of Erudition’ had been diffused in Europe and mainly in its 
southern part, that of Belgium, Netherlands and Protestant England.1 
Evidently, the Glorious Revolution of 1688 by being “something besides a 
political change of vast significance and importance” (Thompson 1942, 42) 
changed the intellectual atmosphere in Britain as well. In England, the most 
representative figure of the ‘Age of Erudition’ was Thomas Madox who’s The 
                                                             
1 The milestone of such diffusion in Great Britain was the publication of The Annales of the Kingdom 
of Ireland by four Masters (1612). The chief compiler of this monumental work was the monk 
Mícheál Ó Cléirigh (c. 1590 – 1643).  




History and Antiquities of the Exchequer (1711) comprised the locus classicus 
of this age and became later a standard work for the study of English 
medieval history. Madox’s famous Prefatory Epistle, beyond being a 
comprehensive survey of sources, is an introductory dissertation on the 
nature and methods of historical criticism.  
Essentially, the eighteenth century had ‘professionalized’ this deep 
interest in historical past. It is indicative that in 1724, George I founded for 
every university a professorship of modern history and modern languages. 
Thompson (1942, 94) notices that in the eighteenth century history had been 
thought as “an arsenal of facts with which to bombard the ancien regime and 
bring about the desired reforms”. It was unavoidable that social sciences, 
like social theory and political economy which had been emerging during 
this era, had been deeply influenced by this prevailed attitude on history. 
History afforded invaluable information in regards to the principles of 
human nature which was the subject-matter of Moral Philosophy, the 
mother discipline of both social theory and political economy.  
Especially in Scotland this attitude was ultimately receptive. The 
Scottish university system was highly productive in the eighteenth century 
and prepared students who attained eminence in sciences (Morrell 1971, 159). 
In Scotland history was already inherent in the Scottish general university 
education, being an issue of central importance in any scientific discussion. 
Dow (1987, 341) notices that “it was customary for the professors of physics 
and mathematics for example, to teach the elements of their subjects, as 
being the most important part, and to do so by laying out the historical 
development of ideas”. Hopfl (1978, 32) notes that in any academic 
dissertation in Scotland we anticipate a purely academic and disinterested 
love of reconstructing and making sense of the past experience. Therefore, 
there was, as Taylor (1956, 162) rightly observes, an intellectual impulse in 
Scottish academic life which kindled a zealous spirit of enthusiasm and 
inquiry of historical past in the universities of Scotland.   
However, despite of some radical shifts in historiography, the late 
eighteenth century was identified with narration and description. The role of 
narration was underlying in the writings of the Scottish historical school. 
Smith, the leader of Scottish Historicism, seems to have considered 
narration of primary purview. He noticed in his Lectures on Rhetoric and 
Belles Lettres that  
“The facts which are most commonly narrated and will be most 
adapted to the state of generality of men will be those that are 
interesting and important. Now these must be the actions of men; The 
most interesting and important of these are such as have contributed 
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to great revolutions and changes in State and Governments” (1985, 
xvii, 90) 
Moreover, Kames observed that “Singular events, which by the prevalence of 
chance or fortune excite wonder, are much relished by the vulgar. But 
readers of solid judgment find more entertainment in studying the 
constitution of a state, its government, its laws, the manners of its people” 
(cited in Skinner 1967, 37). Therefore, the Scottish historical school was not 
an anti-narrative one, since a synthesis of narration and historical criticism 
constituted the raison d’ etre of school’s radical views upon history. However 
its history was totally different to the mainstream historiographical 
paradigm which was focalized on pure narration and description. 
Generally, history’s importance is elevated in the writings of the 
Scottish historical school since a distinctive theory of history (that of stages 
theory) established a link between economic and social organisation 
(Skinner 1965, 1-2). The historical factor was firmly embedded in the Scottish 
tradition of economic thought (Campbell 1976, 183) and comprised an 
epistemological element of central importance in the writings of its 
representatives. The ‘art of history’ unified together such diversified figures2 
and established a newfangled interest in the ‘natural history’ of civil society. 
For the eighteenth century’s thinkers, history was the great teacher of 
human experience. It is indicative that for Hume (1985, 566) “history is not 
only a valuable part of knowledge, but open the doors to many other parts, 
[…] affords materials to most of the sciences” and “extends our experience to 
all past ages, and to the most distant nations”. Moreover, in his Introduction 
to A Treatise of Human Nature (1736) Hume noticed that “As the science of 
man is the only solid foundation for the other sciences, so the only 
foundation we can give to this science itself must be laid on experience and 
observation” (Hume 2007, 5). Thereupon, the main ontological premise of 
this school was that in studying any branch of social science, such as law, 
politics, sociology or economics, it is important to go through two distinct 
stages of epistemic thought; the consideration of antecedents and the study 
of present conditions. Smith and his contemporaries seem to have accepted 
Aristotle’s famous dictum that we can only understand what presently exists 
by considering ‘the origins from which it springs’.3 Such a profound focusing 
upon past was decisive in their economic texts: Hume in particular, in his 
                                                             
2 The Scottish historical school was multifarious in its nature. For instance Lord Kames and John 
Millar were the most influential legal minds of their time, David Hume was a profound philosopher 
and historian, William Robertson was an exceptional historian, Francis Hutcheson was the father of 
modernity in history, Adam Ferguson was a great sociologist, Dugald Stewart was an eminent 
economist, and Adam Smith a profound philosopher and political economist. 
3 Aristotle in his Politics (Book I, 1252a) noticed that “If you consider the state-or anything else of 
that matter- in relation to the origins from which it springs, you will arrive at the clearest 
understanding of its nature”.  




Economic Writings, had attempted to incorporate economics into a broader 
science of human experience, at the centre of which stands history. At the 
same time Smith developed a specific theory of history in order to 
understand the function of economic phenomena in his Wealth of Nations. 
Conclusively, it must be noticed that the history of the Scottish 
Enlightenment was in toto different to the orthodox or ‘vulgar history of the 
eighteenth century which was basically concerned with particulars rather 
than universals (Skinner 1967, 46). More specifically, the history of the 
Scottish historical school, despite of accepting the necessity of narration, 
rejected the orthodox view that the study of history necessitates a great 
“concentration of facts and singular events” (Skinner 1965, 3) and promoted 
a history based upon theory and generalisations. 
 
The Newtonian legacy and the ‘Scottish’ Newtonianism 
Substantially such a view upon history was influenced by the general 
fermentations in the disciplines of natural sciences. Essentially, the 
seventeenth century had bequeathed in both natural and moral sciences 
Newton’s revolutionary methodology and philosophy of science. Newton’s 
work, the father of the ‘Age of Reason’ according to Montes (2003, 724; 2008, 
569), was highly perceived by Scottish intellectuals and shaped the general 
academic climate of the eighteenth century.4 The essence of such an 
influence was Newton’s analytic-synthetic method. His methodological 
stance is summurised in his most explicit epistemic reference, that of ‘Query 
31’in his Opticks:  
“The Investigation of difficult Things by the Method of Analysis, 
ought ever to precede the Method of Composition. This Analysis 
consists in making Experiments and Observations, and in drawing 
general Conclusions from them by Induction, and admitting of no 
Objections against the Conclusions, but such as are taken from 
Experiments, or other certain Truths. For Hypotheses are not to be 
regarded in experimental Philosophy. And although the arguing from 
Experiments and Observations by Induction be no Demonstration of 
general Conclusions; yet it is the best way of arguing which the Nature 
                                                             
4 Montes (2008, 564) notices that “There is evidence that Scottish universities were not only 
prominently Newtonian, but also instrumental in establishing Newtonianism in Britain” and it is 
indicative that James Gregory and his nephew David Gregory, both Newtonians in spirit “were 
instrumental in forming generations of eximious mathematicians that helped to spread Newton’s 
early reception” (ibid. 564). Colin Maclaurin was according to Wood (2003, 102) “the most capable 
and energetic exponent of Newtonianism working in Scotland, if not in Britain, during the first half 
of the eighteenth century. He helped not only to consolidate the Newtonian hold of Scottish 
academe, but also to create public science in the Scottish Enlightenment”. Adam Smith was highly 
benefited from Maclaurin’s sophisticated interpretation of Newton (Montes 2003, 723).  
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of Things admits of, and may be looked upon as so much the stronger, 
by how much the Induction is more general. And if no Exception 
occur from Phaenomena, the Conclusion may be pronounced 
generally. But if at any time afterwards any Exception shall occur from 
Experiments, it may then begin to be pronounced with such 
Exceptions as occur. By this way of Analysis we may proceed from 
Compounds to Ingredients, and from Motions to the Forces producing 
them; and in general, from Effects to their Causes, and from particular 
Causes to more general ones, till the Argument end in the most 
general. This is the Method of Analysis: And the Synthesis consists in 
assuming the causes discover’d and establish’d as Principles and by 
them explaining the Phaenomena proceeding from them, and proving 
the Explanations” (Newton [1704] 1730, 404-405).   
Newton’s analytic-synthetic method had been much more influencing in 
Britain -and mainly in its Scottish part- than that of Descartes’, which 
dismissed the side of analysis.5 Descartes by superseding analysis’s 
influential role and by believing that all values (natural, moral, and 
historical) were quantitative, of fixed estimation and of invariable operation, 
promoted a highly abstract and generalised view on historical proceedings.  
However history is a deeply genetic process of change and 
transformation and is never a succession of fixed (or predefined) patterns. 
Therefore Newton’s analytic-synthetic method was of a higher interpretative 
depth. Its ontological content is crystallised in Hume’s words who reminds 
us that scientists proceed ‘from particular instances to general principles’ 
and they “still push on their enquires to principles more general, and rest no 
satisfied till they arrive at those original principles, by which, in every 
science, all human curiosity must be bounded” (Fiori 2012, 415). Newton’s 
method had attained its apogee in Smith’s Wealth of Nations, who was 
according to Cohen (1994, 66) “well educated in Newtonian science”. It was 
Newton’s methodological influence, through his analytic-synthetic method, 
and his acknowledgment that scientific progress is an open-ended process 
that had contributed to the development of Scottish moral philosophy 
(Montes 2008, 566). Wightman (1975, 60) suggests that Newton’s theoretical 
system was largely influencing in Great Britain “half a century before Adam 
Smith could have made his judgment and, a fortiori, before he showed 
himself to have a pretty good idea of its nature”. Therefore, there had been a 
mutual interaction which was extremely fruitful: Scotland was not only an 
early advocate of Newtonianism but more importantly, the Scottish 
                                                             
5 Redman (1993: 221) notices that “Scottish universities accepted very early Newton’s achievements 
as superior to the rival Cartesian philosophy”. It must be noticed Newtonian physics was taught at 
Scottish universities during Smith’s lifetime. Therefore their influence upon him seems to be self-
evident. 




Enlightment, through the Scottish historical school, provided a special 
intellectual framework for assimilating and applying diversified approaches 
to Newton’s revolutionary ideas.  
Montes (2003; 2008) is right in his belief that the adoption (and 
adaption) of Newton’s ideas was in toto different in Scotland in comparison 
to other countries of Europe, especially in its francophone part. However, 
Newtonianism, as a part of an intellectual revolution, cannot be separated 
from other fundamental and momentous debates like that of the critique of 
contractual theories, especially the Hobbesian one, and Montesquieu’s 
historical teachings (Fiori 2012, 414). Especially, Montesquieu’s work was 
highly influential in Scotland. Montesquieu despite of being Cartesian in 
spirit had not downgraded the importance of analysis. He noticed in his 
Esprit of Laws that the human world is far from being so well governed as 
the physical and it does not conform to exact laws as the physical does (Fiori 
2012, 417). Evidently, such an enunciation is clearly related to the wider 
‘problem of historical change’ as Skinner & Wilson (1975, 7) call it. 
Montesquieu’s frequent references to historical events and facts are so 
multifarious and show his purport in historical past. Evidently, his 
institutional and comparative method was highly influential in the Scottish 
Enlightenment and shaped the general framework of its epistemic 
enunciations.6 Therefore such an interaction of Newton’s method with other 
contemporary strands of philosophical thought produced a ‘Scottish’ 
reception of Newtonianism which was more ‘empirical’ in its nature and 
more historical in its methodology.  
 
Adam Smith: the intellectual product of the Scottish historical 
product  
Substantially, Adam Smith was a product of these parallel 
fermentations and had been a typical child of his own times. A true Scot of 
the eighteenth century as Macfie (1955, 86) calls him. It is indicative that 
Heilbroner (1973, 261) insists that Smith “albeit a major shaping intellectual 
force” was inevitably “a product of his time, sharing with it the limitations 
that seem to our age so patent and so crippling”. This is why Clarke (1926, 
349) warns us to view Smith “in relation to medieval conditions and 
eighteenth century Nationalism and Mercantilism” and “in relation to 
railroads, holding companies and giant power”. Indeed, Smith, despite of 
being a member of a historically specific academic group, was a prominent 
intellectual figure. It is not surprising that Smith wrote about metaphysics, 
                                                             
6 See Fania Oz-Salzberger (2003), “The Political Theory of the Scottish Enlightenment” in Al. 
Broadie (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to the Scottish Enlightenment, Cambridge Companion to 
Philosophy, Cambridge  
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natural history, ethics, political economy, astronomy, rhetoric, jurisprudence 
(Montes 2003, 732), biology (Skinner 1975, 172) and had a perfect command 
of Greek and Latin languages. His caliber impelled Schumpeter to notice 
that “it is hardly credible that The Wealth of Nations and the Essays of 
Astronomy, so utterly diverse in subject matter could be the products of the 
same mind” (cited in Wightman 1975, 45). Conclusively, Skinner & Wilson 
(1975, 1) had shown off his competencies by noticing that “Smith’s 
knowledge is particularly striking in a period where the division of labour 
has enhanced the difficulty of mastering a wide range of subjects. We know, 
for example, that Smith had an extensive knowledge of contemporary work 
in the natural sciences and the arts”. 
Smith as a child of the Scottish Enlightenment had thought history as 
a crucial ingredient in his magna effort: the construction of a general system 
of social science. Smith produced a theory of history which was the 
epistemic motif of his abstract reasoning. His theory of history had a 
threefold influence: It was influenced by a specific philosophy of science, as 
it is defined in his Essays on Astronomy, by the analytic-synthetic method, 
which was Newtonian in spirit but variant to Newton’s method and by his 
History of Historians as it is analysed and presented in his Lectures Rhetoric 
and Belles Lettres. Each of these influences invoked certain features in his 
theory of history. 
 
Smith’s theory of history: its epistemic origins  
Smith, despite of not developing an unambiguously defined 
philosophy of science, unfolded the spirit of it in his great Essays on 
Astronomy (1795) where he developed his views concerning the progress of 
scientific process. It must be noticed that Smith reached his main 
methodological and epistemic principles early in his career without 
fundamentally modified them afterwards (Viner 1968, 323). 
According to Smith, the cause of any scientific project is the sense of 
surprise which is emerging when an observed object does not fall into a 
recognised theoretical pattern (Smith, [1795] 1980, section II, § 9: 42). For 
Smith, the feel of surprise is always followed by that of wonder. Wonder is 
defined by him as “the stop which is thereby given to the career of 
imagination, the difficulty which it finds in passing along such disjoined 
objects, and the feeling of something like a gap or interval betwixt them” 
(Smith, [1795] 1980, section II, § 9: 42-43). Therefore, wonder involves a 
disutility, a sense of discomfort (Skinner 1972, 309) since it raises doubt as to 
the analytical adequacy of the recognised theoretical pattern (Lindgren 1969, 
899). The deficiency of the theoretical pattern is followed by a revision of 




the accepted outlook and “To the extent that this effort is successful, 
confidence that our outlook will enable us to face the future with calm and 
tranquility is reestablished and wonder is diminished, if not eliminated” 
(ibid., 900). Therefore, theory (or science) is modified as a response to the 
emergence of wonder; and if wonder is persisting, the transformation of the 
recognised pattern is established and imagination attains its end. 
Substantially, Smith’s ‘history of science’ is that of ‘revolutions of 
philosophy’ since it “shows the dynamics of scientific problem-solving, in 
which hypotheses or theories evolve in a fairly regular sequence” (Kim 2012, 
805). He notices that the recognised pattern “is subject to a process of 
modification when irregularities that conflict with the accounts and 
predictions of the paradigm are increasingly identified” (ibid., 805). 
Therefore, the emergence, development, and decay of theoretical systems 
have according to Smith an open-ended, typified sequence inasmuch as “a 
system is constructed with the aid of the imagination to provide coherence 
to the appearances. As time passes, irregularities are discovered, and 
successive, gradual modifications are introduced into the system or new 
phenomena are discovered that lead to conflicting accounts or 
dissatisfaction. This makes it likely that the system will be replaced by a new 
system, and so the process starts anew” (Schliesser 2005, 704).7 Thereupon 
wonder is the first principle which prompts man to science and the origins 
of any scientific attempt are rooted in the psychological desire to escape the 
sense of disutility which is associated with the sentiment of wonder.8 
To sum up, there are three sentiments that determine every 
epistemological process: surprise, wonder, and admiration. For Smith, 
Surprise is “the violent and sudden change produced upon the mind, when 
an emotion of any kind is brought suddenly upon it” (Smith, [1795] 1980, 
section I, § 5: 35); Wonder “is that uncertainty and anxious curiosity excited 
by its singular appearance, and by its dissimilitude with all objects he had 
hitherto observed” (Smith, [1795] 1980, section II, § 4: 40)9; while admiration 
is attained through the discovery of “the real chains which Nature makes use 
to bind together her several operations” (Smith, [1795] 1980 section IV, § 76: 
105). Montes’s (2003, 734) comment is indicative, “Curiosity, intellectual 
dissatisfaction, and the scientific success that will soothe the mind, 
represent these three states of the mind”. These stages constitute the 
ontological raison d’ etre of any epistemological attempt. The modus vivendi 
                                                             
7
 Smith was one of the first authors to see regular and successive revolutions in the history of 
astronomy and, perhaps, sciences and other forms of inquiry more broadly” (Schliesser 2005, 704). 
8 Wightman (1975, 56) believes that wonder is the most important contribution of Smith’s 
philosophy of science. 
9 Smith evinces the role of wonder in scientific inquiries by comparing scientists with musicians 
who “have trained their minds to see as altogether separated any events which fall short of the most 
perfect connection” (Megill 1975, 82). 
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behind every analytical effort is the psychological need to soothe the 
imagination by eliminating surprise and wonder caused by incoherent and 
disjoined events (Megill 1975, 85). Therefore wonder, and not any 
expectation of advantage from its discoveries, is the first principle which 
prompts mankind to the study of philosophy and the original sense of 
pleasure that is derived from it prompts men to inquiries (Smith, [1795] 1980, 
Section III, § 3: 51). Conclusively, the basic purpose of any scientific 
explanation is to escape the disutility of wonder which is vanished altogether 
upon the clear discovery of a connecting chain of events, or of a theory in 
more modern terms (Skinner 1972, 309).        
Accordingly Smith identifies scientific process with a certain mental 
attitude since the mind “constantly strives to place the appearance of nature 
into categories with which it is already familiar, and lessens discomfort from 
the unexpected” (Myers 1975, 282) and tries to reduce the possibility of this 
discomfort by maintaining familiar categories into which it can readily place 
most of the appearances coming before it. Smith noticed that the human 
mind:  
“endevours to find out something which may fill up the gap, which 
like a bridge may so far at least unite those seemingly disjoined 
objects, as to render the passage of the thought between them 
smooth, and natural, and easy” (Smith, [1795] 1980, section II, § 8: 42) 
Therefore, the mind searches for a thread to bridge the gap and unite the 
disparate appearances before it. The purpose of such unification is to 
facilitate the movement of thought across this gap. Substantially, theory10 is 
something that moves the mind in the direction of an explanation of an 
anomaly (a disjoined object or event) which is not exemplified by the 
previous theoretical paradigm. Indeed, the explanation that is offered by 
theory “can only satisfy the mind if it is coherent, capable of accounting for 
observed appearances, and stated in terms of ‘familiar’ or plausible 
principles” (Skinner 1998, 13). Therefore, as Endres (1991, 84) observes, 
“Smith’s methodology emphasises a human need to overcome discomfort 
rendered by discordant observed appearances, with coherent explanation” 
while “the latter is designed to satisfy a psychological need to remove 
disutility and is successful only if it is founded on plausible and ‘familiar’ 
connecting principles” (ibid., 84).  
                                                             
10
 Smith in his TMS and WN avoided the use of the word ‘system’ and replaced it with that of theory 
which seems to have been nothing more than a ‘good’ system. As Megill (1975, 85) rightly observes, 
“Significantly, in both The Theory of Sentiments and the Wealth of Nations Smith uses the word 
system when referring to the inadequate moral and economic theories of his predecessors”. For 
instance, in the Book IV of his locus classicus he proceeded in the examination of “two such 
systems, ‘the mercantile system’, better known as mercantilism, and the ‘agricultural systems’, of 
which the most recent example was Physiocracy” (ibid., 91). 




More specifically Smith believed that a well defined theory has to be 
comprehensive and coherent11, familiar and simple12, but also aesthetic 
(beautiful) and proper13 in order to appeal to the imagination by 
demonstrating the connecting principles of nature. Thereupon, although 
Smith did not speak (or search) for the absolute truth he gave reasons (i.e. 
simplicity, distinctness, comprehensibility, lack of reasonable competitors) 
for why a doctrine can be considered as an ‘established’ system (Schliesser 
2005, 708). 
Smith believed that a theoretical system of such qualities has to 
function as a machine, having a certain and well defined end.14 He noticed: 
“Systems in many respects resemble machines. A machine is a little 
system, created to perform, as well as to connect together, in reality, 
those different movements and effects which the artist has occasion 
for. A system is an imaginary machine invented to connect together in 
the fancy those different movements and effects which are already in 
reality performed” (Smith, [1795] 1980, Section IV, § 19: 66). 
Substantially, the end of a well defined theoretical system is to discover 
those great connecting principles that bind together all these discordant 
phenomena, and typify schemas that exemplify these events. Smith praised 
Newton’s system which by introducing one great ‘connecting principle’ -that 
of gravity- was much simpler than that of Kepler, Descartes, and Galileo. He 
noticed in his Theory of Moral Sentiments that “Human society when we 
                                                             
11 Coherency is related to what extent the background knowledge of the theoretical system is 
plausible (Kim 2012, 807). For Smith coherency is the most important standard of theory’s 
evaluation since the judgment of hypotheses is related to such background knowledge. 
12 Smith believed that simplicity is an important feature of a well-defined theory. For instance, as 
Smith noticed in his Essays of Astronomy the system of concentric spheres (Smith, [1795] 1980, 
section IV, § 7: 57-58) and that of Ptolemy (Smith, [1795] 1980, section IV, § 25: 69-70) were 
overpassed due to their lack of simplicity. For example, as Lindgren (1969 ff. 9, 902) rightly 
observes, “It was only when Newton suggested that gravity (which was clearly familiar) produces 
the motions which describe the courses of the heavenly bodies at the velocities and distances 
suggested by Kepler, that a satisfactory alternative to ancient superstition was at last developed”.    
13 Lindgren (1969, 905) notices that “an adequate outlook must not only meet the standards of 
comprehensiveness, coherence, and familiarity, but also that of beauty”. Smith in many points of 
his work spoke of the ‘love of analogy’ (Smith 1980, 231). In his polemic against both Ptolemaic and 
Copernican systems he notices that based on both explanatory and predictive powers both systems 
have been equally favoured in regards to the capacity of complying with the same observations. 
However with respect to aesthetics the latter provided more coherence and simplicity (Smith, [1795] 
1980, section IV, § 32: 74-75). 
14 Smith’s most interesting epistemological project was to systematise ‘the natural order of things’ in 
economic and ethical processes. In this project, he attempted to discern the end of each procedure. 
He noticed, “In every part of the universe we observe means adjusted with the nicest artifice to the 
ends which they are intended to produce; and, in the mechanism of a plant, or animal body, admire 
how every thing is contrived for advancing the two great purposes of nature, the support of the 
individual, and the propagation of the species. But in these, and in all such objects, we still 
distinguish the efficient from the final causes of their several motions and organisations” (Smith 
[1759] 1761, Part II, Section ii c. iii: 147). 
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contemplate it in a certain abstract and philosophical light, appears like a 
great, an immense machine, whose regular and harmonious movements 
produce a thousand agreeable effects” (Smith [1759] 1761, Part VII, Section 
III, c. I, § 2, 316 added italics,). On the other hand, new and singular events 
excite wonder in people’s imagination and produce discomfort and tumult 
in the imagination (Smith [1759] 1761, Part II, Section, III, § 39, 154).  
Therefore a theory which is based ontologically to some vigorous and 
indisputable principles gives us pleasure since there is a propensity, natural 
to all men, “to account for all appearances from as few principles as possible” 
(Smith [1759] 1761, Part VII, Section II, c. ii, § 14: 299). Theory, in Smith’s 
thought, is identified with a ‘connected order’ that adjoins parts which seem 
to have some (natural) relation to one another (Smith [1776] 1976, Book V, c. 
i, § 9: 199). Therefore, a theory is an effort to introduce order and harmony 
into observed appearances by using some principles that connect 
phenomena into a chain-like fashion (Redman 1993, 216). Essentially, Smith’s 
theory of history is seated on such an epistemic understanding of science 
and tries to give order to seemingly disparate events.  
 
Smith’s analytic-synthetic method and his critical realism 
As it is indicated above, Smith adopted Newton’s analytic-synthetic 
method and regarded it as the most influential of all. Smith was familiar 
with Newton’s work due to his recorded interest in natural science and 
mathematics (Kim 2012, 799). He shared with Newton the same ‘philosophy 
of science’ since he saw science as an open-ended process of successive 
approximations” (Montes 2008, 570). Smith does not seem to believe that a 
theoretical system is capable of attaining the absolute truth. Though, he 
proposed a pattern of the evolution of systems of knowledge, not of the 
arrival at a final and immovable truth. 
Skinner (1979, 114) noticed that Smith wrote with an enthusiasm 
concerning Newton’s system “an enthusiasm which was apparently justified 
by the success which that system enjoyed in accounting for a wider range of 
appearances […] in terms of a smaller number of basic (and familiar) 
principles”. For Smith the Newtonian theoretical system succeeded in 
explaining a far wider spectrum of appearances than its predecessors and 
noticed that his system was compatible with order, balance, and equilibrium 
(Skinner 1972, 312, 471). Smith noticed that Newton’s system was ‘the 
greatest and most admirable improvement that was ever made in 
philosophy’ since by joining the movements of the planets by the familiar 
principle of gravity he removed all the difficulties the imagination had 
hitherto felt in attending them through previous astronomical systems. 




Smith adopted with an enthusiasm Newton’s analytic-synthetic 
method by noticing that it is “undoubtedly the most Philosophical, and in 
every science whether of Moralls or Naturall philosophy etc., is vastly more 
ingenious” (1985, xxv, 146). Smith praised the analytic-synthetic method by 
indicating that it 
“gives us a pleasure to see the phenomena which we reckoned the 
most unaccountable all deduced from some principle (commonly a 
well known one) and all united in one chain, far superior to what we 
feel from the unconnected method where everything is accounted for 
by itself without any reference to others” (ibid., 146) 
For Smith a method (or a theory) is judged by the soothingness of man’s 
imagination which is connected with mind’s pleasure. His lengthy comment 
is worth of quoting here:  
“When two objects, however unlike, have often been observed to 
follow each other, and have constantly presented themselves to the 
senses in that order, they come to be so connected together in the 
fancy, that the idea of the one seems, of its own accord, to call up and 
introduce that of other. If the objects are still observed to succeed 
each other as before, this connection, or, as it has been called, this 
association of their ideas, becomes stricter and stricter, and the habit 
of the imagination to pass from the conception of the one to that of 
the other, grows more and more riveted and confirmed […] When 
objects succeed each other in the same train in which the ideas of the 
imagination have thus been accustomed to move, and in which, 
though not conducted by that chain of events presented to the senses, 
they have acquired a tendency to go on of their own accord, such 
objects appear all closely connected with one another, and the 
thought glides easily along them, without effort and without 
interruption. They fall in with the natural career of the 
imagination”(Smith [1795] 1980, Section II, § 7: 40-41). 
Therefore Newton’s analytic-synthetic method was highly influential in 
Smith’s theory of history, since it was the methodological cornerstone of his 
abstract reasoning. More specifically this method was the mean of both 
understanding certain uniformities in the history of the mankind and of 
formulating deductions concerning social and economic events. At the same 
time Smith, despite his evident Newtonian influences, seems to have 
accepted that uniformities in social nature could be violated by appearances 
that are not systematized and interpreted by his analytical principles. Such 
an attitude impelled him to discard ultra-deductivism. Myers (1975, 288) 
notices that he shows “a cautious attitude toward using deduction as a 
general method of reasoning” and “while he admits that such reasoning has 
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helped at times to make great advances in knowledge he, nevertheless, sees 
it as a method that can be grossly misused” (ibid., 288-289). Smith despite of 
accepting the analytical adequacies of deduction he believed that it must be 
used very carefully. In addition he felt that the clarification of the real 
structures and mechanisms of the world necessitates “a creative strategy 
using abduction as well as deduction and induction” (Kim 2012, 800). 
Substantially, such a methodological spirit influenced Smith’s usage of 
the analytic-synthetic method. Accordingly, Smith used it under a 
differentiated, more sophisticated version and might have been “influenced 
by how the Scottish assimilated Newtonianism” (Montes 2008, 569). 
Generally Smith, despite of the fact that he considered the analytic-synthetic 
method “to be the scientific method par excellence” (Freudenthal 1981, 135) 
he used it under a more sinuous way. Smith, on the one hand adopted 
Newtonian method’s primal principles but at once he attributed new 
functions to it. These functions implied a historical dimension to these 
principles reflecting Montesquieu’s genetic account of history and his 
evolutionary views of society (Cremaschi 1989, 89). Therefore Smith was 
“neither sympathetic to the mechanistic view of the world, nor did he 
unconditionally endorse an axiomatic-deductive approach to reality” 
(Montes 2003, 731-732).  
Smith’s modification of the analytic-synthetic method is clearly 
influenced by his critical realist perspective. Such a perspective is 
determined by Smith’s suggestion of the ‘stratification and connection of 
reality’ (Kim 2012, 802). Smith was neither a pure deductivist, nor a strict 
empiricist15, since his epistemic views of society as consisting of different 
(dissociated levels) gave to him the opportunity to be as theoretical, as 
historical in his approach. The end of the smithian work as Fiori (2001, 429) 
eloquently describes it is “to show that the surface of visible events might be 
connected to the invisible principles of organisation of complex systems in 
both the physical and economic world”. Such a continuous confliction 
between visible and invisible levels of reality implied a critical realist 
perspective and underlined the congenital relation between history and 
theory. The end of the smithian work, as Fiori understands it, presupposes a 
critical realist methodology.16 Smith described the content of his 
methodology by noticing that: 
                                                             
15 Moreover Smith was not “the traditional empiricist confining his philosophical mind exclusively 
to the empirical and actual domains of reality” (Montes 2003, 741); and his denial of political 
arithmetic convinces this (Hollander 1973, 3). Such an interpretation is moving against to a variety 
of classical readings of Smith that underlie his empirical reasoning (see Bittermann 1940). 
16
 There is a variety of contributions who are pointing out the critical realist perspective of the 
smithian work (Lawson 1994; Montes 2003; Wilson & Dixon 2006; Kim 2012). 




“The causes that may be assigned for any event are of two Sorts; either 
the externall causes which directly produced it, or the internall ones, 
that is those causes that tho’ they no way affected the event yet had an 
influence on the minds of the chief actors so as to alter their conduct 
from what it would otherwise have been […] Thus Caesar, Polybius, 
and Thucydides, who had all been engaged in most of the battles they 
describe, account for the fate of the battle by the Situation of the two 
armies, the nature of the Ground, the weather etc. Those on the other 
hand who have little acquaintance with the particular incidents of this 
sort that determine events, but have made enquires into the nature of 
the human mind and the severall passions, endevour by means of the 
circumstances that would influence them, to account for the fate of 
battles and other events, which they could not have done by those 
causes that immediately determine them” (Smith, 1985, xvii. 93-94) 
Smith following Tacitus illustrated the critical perspective of his approach:  
“In describing the more important actions he does not give us an 
account of their externall causes, but only of the internall ones, and 
tho this perhaps will not tend so much to instruct us in the knowledge 
of the causes of events; yet it will be more interesting and lead us into 
a science no less usefull, to wit, the knowledge of the motives by 
which men act; a science too that could not be learned from it” 
(Smith, 1985, xx, 113).  
Therefore, Smith’s search for principles on the basis of detailed historical 
analysis- and within an open theoretical system- is totally consistent to his 
critical realist methodology. For instance Lawson (1994, 504) found out a 
critical realist concept of ‘position-practice system’ in Smith’s epistemology, 
impelling Montes (2003, 741) to conclude that “not only […] critical realism 
sheds further light on our understanding of Smith, but also that critical 
realism can find in the ‘father of the science’ an eminent ally for arguing 
against the mainstream insistence on axiomatic-deductive models”.  
Smith’s critical methodology has a threefold epistemic dimension: 
firstly, it spots out observation’s importance since it accords that simple 
(and principal) ideas are “derived from sense impressions” (Kim 2012, 801); 
secondly it suggests that the imagination makes coherent principles 
concerning repeated events (Montes 2003, 729) and lastly, it promotes 
generalisation and classification in accordance to inductive logic. However, 
Smith, despite of the fact that he recognised that inductive reasoning 
constitute a valuable source of human knowledge, he insisted that “scientific 
knowledge is basically grounded in the discovery of a generative causal 
mechanism on the real level, from which the observed effects are believed to 
emerge” (Kim 2012, 817). Evidently, such an understanding of social reality is 
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related to his theoretical history which’s aim is to imprint certain 
uniformities in human nature.  
Thereupon, the symphysis of deduction and induction and his faith 
upon both generalizations and unique (specific) social events is related to an 
early critical realism which is highly diffused in the smithian work. 
Therefore, Smith’s analytic-synthetic method, which connected 
methodologically theoretical and narrative history, was the method of 
moving by induction from phenomena to the framing of principles and then 
deducing the phenomena from those principles (Hatherington 1983, 504). 
Evidently, such a methodological stance illustrates the roles of both sense 
experience and history in the formulation of analytical principles.   
The importance of induction was influential in Newton’s theoretical 
system. As it was noticed above Newton was explicit in regards to his 
methodology. However Smith despite of his praises on Newton’s theoretical 
system and its affinities with his; he noticed that it cannot “be taken as a 
final account of the way things ‘really’ are” (Diamond 1986, 61). Smith 
believed that human universe which is irregular, history-dependent, and 
unpredictable seems radically to diverge from Newton’s physical universe 
which is regular, a-historical and predictable (Fiori 2012, 413).  
Thereupon, Smith’s analytic-synthetic method was moving ‘from the 
concrete’ to the abstract’, from a simple process to a more complex one and 
reversely ‘from the abstract to the concrete’ and this process makes it 
possible to connote an element in its individuality. As Fiori notices “the 
complete process is from (unrelated) concrete to abstract entities, and 
subsequently from abstract to concrete objects”(ibid., 419). Evidently, such a 
methodological attitude favoured the widespread usage of historical 
evidence and highlightened history’s importance. Conclusively, Smith’s 
method is compacted in Megill’s (1975, 93-94) ingenious observation: 
“After observing the nature, the philosopher constructs theories to 
render those observations intelligible. He then observes nature again 
in order to detect discordances between these theories and the world 
experience. In the light of these new observations, he will either 
attempt to construct more comprehensive theories, or he will 
continue to make observations and collect data preliminary to a 
future attempt at theory-building”. 
 
Smith and History 
Smith adopted the general (Scottish) attitude towards history and 
proceeded to a continuous elaboration of both history and broad 




sociological facts and comparisons to develop his arguments and 
demonstrate his more abstract ideas. His influences were diversified. Taylor 
(1956, 264) notes that “From Hutcheson, he absorbed the doctrines of Hugo 
Grotius, who was a tradition in Hutcheson’s classes, of Samuel von 
Pufendorf, whose De Officio Hominis et Civis, was a basic text, and of 
Gershom Carmichael whom Hutcheson regarded as by far the best 
commentator on that book”. Despite of the fact that many commentators 
describe Smith ‘as a superb historian’ (Groenewegen 1982, 7), he was not a 
historian, in the strict sense of David Hume, Lord Kames, William 
Robertson, John Millar, and Adam Ferguson, but he “thought a great deal 
about history; he was deeply conscious of the history he is living in” and “it is 
probable that he saw the human species as immersed in history in all 
moments of its existence” (Pocock 2006, 270). His early biographer, Dugald 
Stewart ([1793] 1829, 5) noticed Smith’s deep interest in history and his more 
systematised commentator, Skinner (1965, 3), has pointed out that Smith 
was “inclined towards historical studies from an early period of his life”. 
Smith by having a considerable historical perspective and by seeking in 
Clarke’s words (1926, 359) ‘for the roots that things have in the past’, had 
contributed to the development of historical thought in new directions and 
to the acquisition of new meanings by the term ‘history’.  
Essentially, the historical element was of prime importance in his 
moral, judicial, and economic discussions. It was a central feature of the 
analytical side of his methodology. Fiori (2012, 422) observes that “Smith in 
Languages, History of Astronomy, and Wealth of Nations, always treated 
subjects in which history and contingencies matter”. Substantially, in Smith, 
the historical study became an epistemic tool to construct a coherent and 
holistic system of social science (Kim 2009, 41).17 Undeniably, this 
methodological treatment attained its apogee in the Wealth of Nations 
where, economics and history exist together, inextricably interwoven” 
(Campbell 1976, 183).  
Evidently his faith on history (as evidence) is connected with the 
inductive side of his methodology. Smith despite of according an analytical 
primacy to deduction, was not a pure deductivist (in the sense of Walras 
was) and believed that general principles or axioms could be derived 
inductively. Such a highlightened role of induction had been a mutual 
methodological motif in the writings of the Scottish historical school. The 
Scottish philosophers discovered ‘general principles’ concerning human 
nature “by using the technique of induction, i.e. framing ‘a universal 
principle’ on the basis of observation of a vast mass of particular cases” 
                                                             
17 It is indicative that Smith in his 248 Letter to Rochefoucauld, dated on 1st November 1785 noticed 
his interest in “a sort of philosophical history of all the different branches of literature” (Smith 1977, 
346).  
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(Skinner 1967, 35). Evidently their approach was both analytical and 
historical and “they sought principles and causes so that if it is necessary to 
start from the facts of history” (Skinner 1965, 3).  
Therefore observation (and history) constituted a central part of their 
analysis. Hume was the greatest exponent of induction. In his Introduction 
to his A Treatise of Human Nature (1739) he noticed that 
“We must therefore glean up our experiments in this science from a 
cautious observation of human life, and take them as they appear in 
the common course of the world, by men’s behaviour in company, in 
affairs, and in their pleasures. Where experiments of this kind are 
judiciously collected and compared, we may hope to establish on 
them a science which will not be inferior in certainty, and will be 
much superior in utility, to any other human comprehension” ([1736] 
2007, 7) 
Substantially, according to Hume, the real foundation of any science must 
be seated on sense experience and observation, namely on history. As 
Skinner (1990, 146) noticed: for Hume “The study of human nature was thus 
to be based upon empirical evidence”. As Hume himself made clear, the 
Treatise constituted an attempt to introduce the ‘experimental method of 
reasoning into moral subjects’. Essentially, despite of the fact that theory has 
to explore the underlying causal mechanisms of social phenomena, there 
was no suggestion that such an exploration should be divorced from 
experience and historical evidence. 
Smith proposed the application of ‘the experimental method’ and 
based the formulation of his general principles on observation and on 
‘actual’ history. For instance A. Dow, S. Dow & A. Hutton (1997, 373) notice 
that “Smith’s observations of the social aspect of human nature led him to 
expound his principle of sympathy in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, while 
his observation of economic processes led him to expound the division of 
labour in The Wealth of Nations” (added italics). Smith’s Newtonian 
analytic-synthetic method impelled him to accord a special status on 
observation. Observation constituted the raison d’ etre of the analytical part 
of his method. He noticed in his Theory of Moral Sentiments that “the 
general maxims of morality are formed, like all other maxims from 
experience and induction […] But induction is always regarded as one of the 
operations of reason. From reason, therefore, we are always properly said to 
derive all those general maxims and ideas” (Smith [1759] 1761, Part VII, 
Section III, c. ii, § 6: 319, added italics).  
Therefore Smith proposed a sophisticated version of analytic-
synthetic method as long as in his Lectures Rhetoric and Belles Lettres 




(1985,xxv, 138) he noticed that knowledge requires the methods of 
‘experimental philosophy’, using the technique of induction (analysis) in 
establishing basic (connecting) principles; and deduction (synthesis) for the 
clarification of social and economic phenomena. Substantially analysis was 
related to a narrative use of history, pointing out direct observations and 
events; while synthesis was connected with a theoretical history that was 
used in the typification of regularities and uniformities in human life.  
 
Conclusive Remarks 
Thereupon the threefold dimension of Smith’s theory of history 
constituted the epistemic framework of his theory of history. Such a 
dimension influenced the epistemological essence of his historising. Smith 
used a type of theoretical history, with evident Newtonian influences in 
order to typify regulations and uniformities in the economic and social 
history of human mankind while at the same time he used a pure type of 
narrative history in order to either support such generalisations or pinpoint 
deviations from his theoretical outlook. Evidently, such a theory, despite of 
being open to contingencies and irregularities was both abstract and 
generalised, being an epistemological tool of high importance in the 
smithian work.  
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